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ABSTRACT 
Key technological advances in wireless communications, Micro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS), and digital circuitry 
have energized the research community to focus on the challenges of wireless sensor networks.  In this paper, we propose a 
new pre-distribution key management scheme that meets the operational and security requirements of wireless sensor 
networks and provide authentication and key distribution in one set of protocols.  Our scheme allows selective key revocation 
and node re-keying and posits improved network resiliency over existing key pre-distribution schemes.  The scheme is based 
on probability key sharing among sensor nodes of a random graph and incorporates a threshold property.  Uncompromised 
nodes in a sensor network are secure provided that an adversary compromises less than a threshold-number of nodes.  We 
describe the details of our algorithm and briefly compare it with other proposed schemes.  
Keywords 
Security algorithms, wireless sensor networks, pre-distribution key management 
INTRODUCTION 
Wireless sensor networks have emerged as an innovative class of networked embedded systems due to the union of ever 
smaller, less costly embedded processors and wireless interfaces with micro-sensors based on micro-mechanical systems 
(MEMS) technology (Peters, Smith, Medeiros, and Rohrer, 2001).  Wireless sensor networks are composed of small 
autonomous devices, or sensor nodes, that are networked together.  Each node is equipped with one or more sensors, storage 
and processing resources, and communication and instrumentation subsystems.  The sensors observe phenomena; each sensor 
is specialized to monitor a specific environmental parameter such as thermal, optic, acoustic, seismic, or acceleration 
(Meguerdichian, Koushanfar, Potkonjak, and Srivastava, 2001).  Sensor nodes typically perform their tasks unattended, often 
in remote locations.  They may be deployed either inside, or nearby, target phenomenon to be studied.   
Typical sensor networks will support a variety of military, medical, environmental, and commercial applications.  Remote 
sensors could reduce confusion within combat zones by collecting information about battlefield conditions.  Sensor networks 
are currently being used for condition-based maintenance of complex equipment in factories.  Natural environments (i.e., 
remote ecosystems, endangered species, disaster 
sites, forest fires.) can be monitored with sensor 
networks (Kahn, Katz and Pitzer, 1999; Park, 
Savvides, and Srivastava, 2001).   
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Figure 1 – Sensor Network Architecture 
Sensor networks often contain one or more sinks 
that provide centralized control.  A sink typically 
serves as the access point for the user or as a 
gateway to another network (Akyildiz, Su, 
Sankarasubramaniam, and Cayirci, 2003).  Large 
sensor networks can be composed of thousands of 
sensor nodes deployed in the field to jointly 
observe a region.  Figure 1 depicts a typical 
sensor network.  Compromise of any node, 
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particularly the sink, is a sensor network security concern, but outside the scope of this paper. 
Sensor networks have several major constraints awaiting research resolution: limited processing power, limited storage 
capacity, limited bandwidth, and limited energy.  Researchers are working to solve many of the limitations affecting sensor 
nodes and networks.  Some researchers are working to improve node design; others are developing improved protocols 
associated with a sensor network; still others are working to resolve security issues.  The focus of our research involves 
secure key distribution schemes within wireless sensor networks. 
KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES IN SENSOR NETWORKS 
Sensor networks are typically wireless deployments, sometimes in hostile environments, and are subjected to greater security 
risks.  Establishing secure communications involving the setup and distribution of secret keys is an open problem for sensor 
network researchers.  Currently, there are three general key agreement schemes:  trusted-server or arbitrated protocol, self-
enforcing, and key pre-distribution scheme (Du, Ding, Han, and Varshney, 2003).  The trusted-server scheme requires a 
trusted server to establish shared-session keys between nodes and is prone to directed attacks against this central point of 
weakness.  Another key agreement scheme is the self-enforcing scheme, which depends upon asymmetric protocols and 
algorithms.  However, with the low memory and energy constraints of sensor nodes, public-key algorithms common in 
asymmetric cryptography limits the practical use of this key distribution scheme.  Presently, the only practical scheme for key 
distribution in large sensor networks is key pre-distribution, where key information is installed in each sensor node prior to 
deployment.  Typically, two solutions have been used: 1) a single mission key where all nodes carry a master secret key or 2) 
a set of separate n – 1 keys, each being a pairwise set that is privately shared with another sensor node (Eschenauer and 
Gilgor, 2002; Du, Fang, Wang, and Chen, 2003).  Both are inadequate for use in sensor networks since conciliation of the 
single mission key may compromise the entire network and storage of n – 1 keys in each sensor node or n(n – 1)/2 per sensor 
network bounds practical adoption.  To overcome the challenges and limitations associated with both schemes, several other 
key management schemes have been proposed. 
Eschenauer and Gilgor’s Random Key Pre-Distribution Scheme 
Eschenauer and Gilgor (Eschenauer and Gilgor, 2002) proposed a random key pre-distribution scheme based on probabilistic 
key sharing and utilization of a simple shared-key discovery protocol for key distribution, key revocation, and node re-
keying.  Prior to a sensor network deployment, each sensor node receives a key ring with a randomly chosen subset of keys 
from a large key pool.  Upon deployment and network initialization, sensor nodes will be able to establish a secure and direct 
communication link provided that a shared key exists between one or more pairs of sensor nodes.  Due to the random 
distribution of keys to each sensor node, it is probable that a shared key may not be available, necessitating an intermediary 
node with a common key between the two sensor nodes to establish a common session key.  Eschenauer and Gilgor found 
that to establish “almost certain shared-key connectivity for a 10,000-node network, a key ring of only 250 keys randomly 
selected from a 100,000 pool has to be pre-distributed to every sensor node.” 
Eschenauer and Gilgor’s key distribution scheme consists of three phases:  key pre-distribution, shared key-discovery, and 
path-key establishment.  The key pre-distribution phase occurs prior to sensor node deployment.  During this phase, a large 
pool of P random keys (e.g., 217 – 2 20 keys) and their key identifiers are generated.  Each sensor node receives a subset of 
randomly chosen k keys and their associated key identifiers plus a shared key with a trusted controller node that stores all 
keys and associated identifiers for every network node.  The shared key between the controller node and each sensor node is 
unique and is infrequently used to support key revocation.  The purpose of the key pre-distribution phase is to ensure that a 
small number of keys are available to probabilistically establish a common key between two or more sensor nodes during the 
shared-key discovery phase. 
The shared-key discovery phase occurs post-hoc of the sensor network deployment during an initialization period where each 
sensor node attempts to discover its neighbors with which its shares a common key(s).  This can be done by the broadcast of 
each sensor nodes key identifier list in plaintext or a list α, EKi (α), i = 1, … , k, where α is a challenge.  Decryption with a 
proper key of EKi (α) would meet the challenge and establish a shared key with the broadcasting node.  It is possible that 
more than one pair of sensor nodes may share the same key since all keys are randomly chosen from a larger pool set.   
The path-key establishment phase is used to assign a path-key to selected sensor-node pairs within a defined communication 
range that do not share a common key but are connected by two or more links created during the shared-key discovery phase.  
An intermediary node generates the path-key with a shared key between two or more unconnected link nodes.  Path-keys do 
not have to be generated by the intermediary, as a number of keys are available on its key ring after the shared-key discovery 
phase is finished.  
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Blom’s Symmetric Key Generation Scheme 
Du et al. (2003) proposed a pre-distribution scheme that adapted ideas from Blom’s symmetric key generation system (Blom, 
1985) and Eschenauer and Gilgor’s algorithm previously discussed.  According to Blom, any pair of nodes can calculate a 
secret pairwise key between them using distinct data elements stored in λ + 1 memory spaces in each node.  Blom posited 
that “as long as no more than λ nodes are compromised, the network is perfectly secure (referred to as the λ-secure 
property).”  Increasing λ leads to greater network resiliency but also leads to higher memory utilization within each sensor 
node.  To calculate a secret pairwise key, each sensor node uses a data set derived from several linear algebra operations.   
1. During the pre-deployment phase, a (λ + 1) x N matrix G over a 
finite field GF(q), where q is an element within the finite field, N 
is the number of sensor nodes in the network and λ is the 
security parameter previously discussed, is constructed.  To meet 
the λ-secure property, G must be linearly independent.  It has 
been shown that a Vandermonde matrix is linearly independent 
when its elements s, s2, s3, … , sN are all distinct (MacWilliams 
and Sloane, 1977).  A feasible (λ + 1) x N matrix G over a finite 
field GF(q) can be constructed based on this type of matrix (Du 
et al, 2003; MacWilliams and Sloane, 1977) depicted in 
Equation 1.  Each nonzero element of GF(q) can be represented 
by some power of si  for some 0 < i ≤ q –1, where q is chosen to 
be the smallest prime number larger than 2key size.   
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2. During pre-deployment, a random (λ + 1) x (λ + 1) symmetric matrix D over GF(q) is computed and used to 
compute an N x (λ + 1) matrix A, which is equal to .  Matrix D is private information and must be 
kept secret.  Matrix A is the transpose of .  Therefore, the kth column of becomes the kth row of 
.   
( TGDA ⋅= )
) )
)
( GD ⋅ ( GD ⋅
( )TGD ⋅
3. During pre-deployment, the kth row of matrix A and the kth column from matrix G is stored at sensor node k, where k 
= 1, … , N.  In practice, sk is a primitive or seed element of GF(q) that can be used to calculate the associated 
column values of matrix G.  Therefore, only sk needs to be stored at sensor node k. 
4. After sensor node deployment, two nodes i and j can find the pairwise key between them by exchanging their 
columns of G and using their private rows of matrix A to calculate kij = kji = Ai⋅Gj = Aj⋅Gi = .  This is 
possible since A⋅G is a symmetric matrix.  Figure 2 illustrates how secret pairwise keys are generated. 
( TGA ⋅
  
N
kji 
kij 
N 
( ) GGD T ⋅⋅  
j 
i 
 |      (λ + 1)      | 
( )TGDA ⋅=___ 
 
 
  N 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
x 
N
G
ji 
 
=
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple-Space Key Pre-distribution Scheme 
Under Du et al. multiple key spaces generated from Blom’s λ-secure symmetric key generation system are randomly 
assigned to each sensor node in a network.  This is similar to Eschenauer and Gligor’s assignment of randomly generated 
keys from a large key pool.  Two nodes are able to calculate a unique pairwise key if and only if both nodes share a common 
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key space.  During the pre-deployment phase, a generator matrix G of size (λ + 1) x N is created and followed by the creation 
of ω symmetric matrices D1, …, Dω of size (λ + 1) x (λ + 1) and matrices , where indices i = 1, … , ω, are 
generated.  Each tuple of Ai is defined as a key space.  From Ai, a randomly selected number of 1 < τ  ≤  ω distinct key spaces 
are selected and assigned to each sensor node.  After deployment, each node will attempt to identify its common-space 
neighbors by broadcasting a message that contains its unique node ID, the indices of the key spaces it carries, and the 
assigned column data set or seed value from G.  If nodes i and j are neighbors with a common space (e.g., Sc, with node i 
assigned Ac(i) and seed for G(i) and node j has Ac(j) and the seed for G(j)), a secret pairwise key can be calculated by each 
node independently by kij = kji = Ac(i)⋅G(j) = Ac(j
T
ii GDA )( ⋅=
)⋅G(i). 
OUR PROPOSED KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION SCHEME 
We propose a new key pre-distribution scheme that builds from Blom’s and Eschenauer and Gilgor’s key distribution 
schemes and is supported by points based on key splitting, authentication and key exchange from the Yahalom protocol 
(Schneir, 1996).  Our scheme leverages Eschenauer and Gilgor’s reliance on probabilistic key sharing between nodes that 
have been assigned a randomly selected subset of keys from a larger key pool but, unlike Eschenauer and Gilgor’s scheme of 
storing k, 64-bit keys, we store 32-bit keys in each node and concatenate an additional 32-bit random key for links that are 
able to establish a secure communication link.  A unique 64-bit pairwise key that contains the shared key-half between nodes 
and a second key-half generated after deployment and during a shared-key discovery phase supports each secure link.  The 
second key-half is randomly generated by one of the node-pairs and distributed with support from Blom’s key calculation 
scheme.  Following is the detail of our key pre-distribution proposal in relationship to the three basic phases previously 
discussed:  key pre-distribution phase, shared-key identification phase, and path-key establishment phase.  The path-key 
establishment phase will not be discussed as it assumes the same protocol proposed by Eschenauer and Gilgor. 
1. Generation of Large Key Pool.  A large pool of random 32-bit keys denoted by P and associated identifiers are 
generated.  The size of the pool is sufficiently large (e.g., 100 – 1,000 times the deployed network size) to ensure 
non-probability key attacks are minimized.  Each key will be identified by an integer value 1 to the number of keys 
generated.   
2. Generation of Blom’s System Matrices.  A primitive element, s, is selected from a finite field GF(q) such that the 
element is the smallest prime number larger than 232.  This element represents the seed element of the general 
Vandermonde matrix G shown in Equation 1.  The size of the matrix will equal the number of P keys generated in 
step 1 and an λ equal to a security threshold level appropriate for the network (e.g., λ ≥ 250).  Once a seed value has 
been selected, a random (λ + 1) x (λ + 1) symmetric matrix D is generated and used to compute an N x (λ + 1) 
matrix A = (D⋅G)T.  All elements in each matrix are considered 
non-public information and must be kept secret.  32 bits 32 bits 
3. Node Assignments.  For each sensor node, k randomly selected 
keys and associated identifiers are assigned.  These keys represent 
one-half of the pairwise keys that will be generated between two 
nodes.  Each node will be assigned one row from matrix A 
corresponding to one key and associated key identifier generated 
in step 1.  This row-key pair will be used as a primary identifier 
for each sensor node.  Lastly, the primitive element selected in 
step 2 will be stored in each sensor node’s memory.  This element 
will be used to calculate the corresponding column of matrix G 
for each key identifier selected.  A general memory map for each 
sensor node is shown in Figure 3, where Ax is the row assignment 
from matrix A and IDx, and key (x) are k randomly selected keys 
and associated integer identifiers over 1 < x < k.   
Randomly generated 
key y1 
Idx2, key (x2) 
Randomly generated 
key yK 
Randomly generated 
key y2 
Idxk, key (xk) 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
Primary Key 
Ax1, Idx1, key (x1) 
Figure 3 
Shared-Key Identification Phase 
After sensor network deployment , each node needs to establish a secure communication link with each neighbor who share a 
common key and are within wireless communication range.  This is started with each node broadcasting a message 
containing their primary key identifier and a randomly generated nonce value Nx.  Assuming that nodes i and j are neighbors, 
and have received the broadcast, they will check their memory map for a common key using the received key identifier.  If 
they find that they share a common key, they will each calculate a secret pairwise secret key using Blom’s scheme.  This 
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secret key will be concatenated (symbolized below by ||) with the shared common key and used to encrypt a message that 
contains a new nonce value associated with the responding node, an identification value used to uniquely identify the 
communication link between the nodes, and a random session key Sk that will be used as the second-half of the secret key 
between each node.  The first half of the key will be the common key shared between both node-pairs.  Assuming that Node 
1 and Node 2 each share a common half-key, the following details the steps that both nodes will take in establishing a secure 
communication link.   
1.) Node 1 broadcast ID1||N1, where N1 is a nonce value generated by Node 1 and ID1 is equal to integer 1 and is the 
identifier assigned to Node 1 and its primary key.   
2.) Node 2 picks up ID1||N1, sees it has a key associated with ID1 and sends back to Node 1: ID2||N1||E12(ID12, N2, Sk), 
where ID12 is a random number used as a link identifier between both nodes, N2 is a nonce value generated by Node 
2, Sk is a random 32-bit session key, and E12 ( ) is a symmetric encryption function.  The encryption key for E12 ( ) is 
calculated as follows: 
a. Using the Vandermonde matrix in Equation 1, Node 2 calculates the matrix G column associated with 
Node 1 using the primitive element s stored in Node 2 by the primary integer identifier sent from Node 1 
and raising this seed element to power n for 2 < n ≤ λ.   
b. Node 2 calculates a pairwise secret key between Node 1 and Node 2 using K12 = K21 = A(2) ⋅G(1), where 
A(2) is Node 2 assigned row from matrix A and G(1) is Node 1’s column data. 
c. Node 2 generates an encryption key for E12 ( ) by concatenating the shared key between both nodes and the 
calculated K12 key. 
3.) Node 1, having received ID2|| N1||E12 (ID12, N2, Sk) and using the integer identifier associated with Node 2, calculates 
the key for E12 ( ) following steps 2a-2c.  Node 1 decrypts E12 ( ) to retrieve ID12, N2, and Sk.   
4.) Node 1 sends back an acknowledgement message to Node 2 of N2||Ek (ID12, N1).  This completes the authentication 
and key exchange between both nodes.   
The authentication and key exchange listed above assumes that a shared key will be discovered between two nodes such that 
the shared key is a primary key for one node and an ancillary key for the second node.  In the event that nodes within 
communication range cannot establish a primary to secondary key agreement, nodes will attempt to establish a secondary-to-
secondary key agreement by broadcasting for each ancillary key in its key set a message containing IDX||NX||IDPrimary, where 
IDX is a ancillary key identifier, NX is a nonce value associated with IDX, and IDPrimary is a nodes primary identification 
number.  Once two nodes determine that they share the same key-half, steps 1 – 4 will be followed with IDX||NX||IDPrimary 
replacing ID1||N1 in step 1.  The primary node identifier is used for all Blom matrix calculations. 
Node Revocation 
In the event that a sensor node is compromised, it is important to revoke that hostile node.  Our scheme supports two 
approaches to effect node revocation.  Link revocation removes all communication links, while key revocation removes all 
key(s) associated with the compromised node.  Link revocation allows only selected node-pair links to be removed thereby 
minimizing the impact of revocation on the network.  This can be accomplished since each node-pair shares a mutually 
exclusive link identifier and session key.  While multiple node-pairs may share the same half-key, their other key-half will be 
distinct to each node-pair.  Key revocation, in comparison, removes all shared half-key(s) associated with the compromised 
node, which may cause multiple links to disappear once the key(s) are removed.  Both methods assume that a secure base 
station is used to monitor and manage the sensor network. 
Link revocation can be implemented using a network routing table generated after post-deployment of the sensor network 
and link establishment between node-pairs.  The base station creates a network routing table by having each node-pair 
identify their associated link identifier and having this information sent over the network to a base station.  Key revocation 
follows the same procedure but one or more keys and not associated links are removed during the revocation process.  Once 
the keys have been removed from the memory space of each node, some links may disappear and will require the affected 
nodes to establish new links by restarting the shared-key discovery and/or path-key establishment phases. 
Several options are available to revoke the compromised node including the use of a shared signature key, which is installed 
between a base station and all nodes of the sensor network during the pre-deployment phase.  To initiate revocation of a link 
or key(s), the base station will broadcast to all network nodes a signed revocation message containing the link identifier(s) or 
key(s) to be revoked.  After obtaining the signed revocation message, each node will verify the signature of the signed 
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message and, if valid, will remove the link identifier(s) or key(s) from their memory.  This method is simple to implement but 
poses a security risk due to its reliance on a single signature key.  The second option uses a signed unicast message that 
contains the link identifiers(s) and associated session key(s) that need to be revoked between a base station and each affected 
sensor node in the network.  Each sensor node will share a unique key with the base station that can be installed during the 
pre-deployment phase or computed as Kshared = EKx (ci), where Kx = K1 ⊕, … , ⊕ Kk, Ki are the keys assigned to the sensor 
node, ci is the base station identifier, and EKx is an encryption function with node key Kx.  Security is increase with method 
two and was proposed and used by Eschenauer and Gilgor in their key management scheme.   
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF OUR KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION SCHEME 
Our key pre-distribution scheme, at its fundamental level, is a hybrid between Eschenauer and Gilgor’s promulgation of 
random key distribution and Blom’s generation of pairwise secret keys.  Under Eschenauer and Gilgor’s scheme, a node 
carries a subset of k randomly sampled keys from a larger pool of P keys that, if compromised, will allow an adversary to 
attack successfully with probability of 
P
k
 any sensor network link.  Since multiple nodes may share one or more keys, 
compromising one node may allow an adversary to attack 
p
linksofnumbersharedk ⋅
 links.  Their analysis suggests, 
“compromise of one key does lead to the compromise of another link with probability 0.3, of two other links with probability 
0.1, and so on.”  Under Blom’s key generation scheme, all pairwise keys can be obtained if more than λ nodes are 
compromised.  To improve security, λ can be increased but this requires increased memory space.  Our scheme achieves 
better resilience against node capture over existing key pre-distribution schemes since compromise of one node yields only k 
keys out of a larger pool of P keys, which yield little value without additional compromise of more than λ nodes.  One attack 
potential not addressed by Blom is the compromise of one node and its associated row information of matrix A may allow an 
adversary to masquerade as the captured node and to establish a secure communication link with any sensor node in the 
network.  Undetected, the masquerading node could initiate passive and active attacks including traffic analysis, modification 
of messages, or general disruptions of communications (Schneir, 1996).  Our scheme reduces the probability of this type of 
an attack; compromising the kth row information of matrix A at node k is not sufficient to establish a communication link with 
another sensor node.  An adversary would need to compromise the captured sensor nodes random key set and find another 
node in the network with a common key or key set to integrate a captured node into the network.  
Regardless of the scheme, additional weaknesses are seen with the amount of memory utilization required to store k random 
keys or λ + 1 finite elements from row information of matrix A.  Using 250 as the benchmark for the number of keys or λ + 1 
finite elements stored in each sensor node, and assuming each key and each finite element in λ + 1 is 64-bits, 2 kilobytes of 
RAM would be required.  While a security analysis has not been done to determine what λ-secure value is needed to equal 
the same security level for a defined quantity of keys under Eschenauer and Gilgor’s scheme, it is predicted that a large λ-
value would be needed to meet the same security level between both schemes.  Due to the limited memory capacity 
associated with sensor nodes, increasing the λ-value may not be possible.   
Our proposal uses substantially less memory space.  Under our scheme, each sensor node receives a randomly sampled subset 
of 32-bit keys, compared to 64-bits under the Eschenauer and Gilgor scheme.  Once a secure link is established, an additional 
32-bits is added to create a 64-bit session key but the number of established session keys that must be stored in each node is 
much smaller than storing a k set of 64-bit keys, many of which will never be used once the network field has been 
established.  While our scheme requires the storage of λ + 1 finite elements, it is hypothesized that a small λ-value can be 
chosen to meet a comparable security threshold level.   
BENEFITS SUMMARY OF OUR KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION SCHEME 
This paper posited the details of a new key pre-distribution scheme with the following properties: 
1. Authentication and key distribution in one set of protocols.  Only nodes that share a common key, or use an 
intermediary with a common key, will be able to establish a secure channel.   
2. Establishment of unique communication links with different key-sets that can support future network routing 
establishment and study.  Each communication link between each node-pair is uniquely identified and secure with a 
session key composed of a first-half key common to both and a second half that is randomly generated.  Key 
distribution relies on a nodes ability to calculate a temporary cryptographic key from a set of linear algebra 
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operations defined in Blom’s key generation scheme and is supported by the λ-secure property.  The link identifiers 
can be used for message routing or link revocation in the event of a compromised node-pair. 
3. Theoretically improved network resiliency and lower memory utilization over existing key pre-distribution schemes.  
Our scheme achieves better resilience against node compromise over Eschenauer and Gilgor’s pre-distribution 
scheme since compromise of one node yields only k keys out of a larger pool of P keys.  This provides little value 
without the additional compromise of more than λ nodes, as specified by Blom’s scheme and supported in our 
algorithm.  Lastly, each sensor node receives a randomly sampled subset of 32-bit keys, compared to 64-bits under 
the Eschenauer and Gilgor scheme.  Once a secure link is established, an additional 32-bits is added to create a 64-
bit session key but the number of established session keys that must be stored in each node is much smaller than 
storing a k set of 64-bit keys, many of which will never be used once the network field has been established.    
CONCLUSION 
Nodes within wireless communication range will be able to establish a shared-key connectivity provided that they meet the 
points listed above.  While limitations of a sensor network (e.g., wireless communication range, mutually exclusive key sets, 
etc.) may preclude a network with 100% shared-connectivity, it should be possible to calculate the required key size, k, pool 
size, P, and λ-secure level for a sensor node with memory size, m, so that k nodes are connected.  Eschenauer and Gilgor 
showed using random graph theory that share-connectivity was “almost certain” for a 10,000-node network with a key ring of 
250 keys drawn out of a pool of 100,000.  While it is expected that the conclusions proposed by Eschenauer and Gilgor 
would also hold in our proposed scheme, a detailed mathematical study is required for validation.  We are presently 
developing mathematical models that will analyze our algorithm and simulation models to test its performance.  Additional 
work is required to validate the premise that our proposed scheme provides greater resiliency to security attacks than other 
schemes addressed in this paper. 
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